Pentru ca citesc prea mult. Sa va explic teoria micro-economica a scriiturii. Un individ care citeste disproportionat in raport cu ceea ce scrie este expus la riscul unei balante de scris-citit deficitare. Prin urmare, individul cade pe mana logopolurilor externe ce inevitabil antreneaza inflatie literara interna si cresterea ratei anacolutului. In mod sigur, pe nefericit il pasc interjectii sociale si alte manifestatii lexicale suplicitare... In plus, cel mai simplu mod de a evita sa vorbim prostii e sa le scriem.
l'auteur
21 January 2012
8 November 2011
Democracy hard to love
"Democracy is hard to love. Perhaps some people enjoy making speeches, confronting those with whom they disagree, or standing up to privileged and powerful people with claims and demands. Activities like these, however, make many people anxious. Perhaps some people like to go to meetings after a hard day’s work and try to focus discussion on the issue... But most people would rather watch television, read poetry, or make love"
Iris M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000 p. 16
Iris M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, 2000 p. 16
22 February 2011
Terra nullis doctrine
The doctrine backs the claims to territory of white settlers on basis that the indigenous people were presumably not making productive use of the land. It goes back to Lockean conception of property, according to which you come to possess something if you mix your labour with an un-appropriated object. The legal claim was dismissed by the High Court of Australian in Mabo v. Queensland (1991).
21 February 2011
Stay put
"[N]ations which are still barbarous have not got beyond the period during
which it is likely to be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners. Independence and nationality, so essential to the due growth and development of a people further advanced in improvement, are generally impediments to theirs." J.S.Mill
which it is likely to be for their benefit that they should be conquered and held in subjection by foreigners. Independence and nationality, so essential to the due growth and development of a people further advanced in improvement, are generally impediments to theirs." J.S.Mill
4 February 2011
Interesting version of all-subjected principle
Women entitled to go to the scaffold should also be entitled to go to assembly.
Olympe de Gouges (quoted in S. Näsström, "The Challenge
of the All-Affected Principle", 2010)
Olympe de Gouges (quoted in S. Näsström, "The Challenge
of the All-Affected Principle", 2010)
10 January 2011
King Den's Sandal Label
Long time before Max Weber, one of the oldest representations of leadership associated political power with (legitimate?) violence. Here is the able king Den of Egypt at around 3000 BC making a substantive political statement.
More in "A History of the World in 100 Objects" by Neil MacGregor (2010)
British Museum
Costica Dumbrava
More in "A History of the World in 100 Objects" by Neil MacGregor (2010)
British Museum
Costica Dumbrava
"self" wanted!
"Nearly forty years ago a Professor of Political Science who was also President of the United States, President Wilson, enunciated a doctrine which was ridiculous, but which was widely accepted as a sensible proposition, the doctrine of self-determination. On the surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide, until somebody decides who are the people."
(I. Jennings, 1956)
Costica Dumbrava
(I. Jennings, 1956)
Costica Dumbrava
21 November 2010
Sunday thought, 21.11.2010
Access to citizenship status or political membership
Citizenship means many things. Trying to reveal the genuine characteristic of (national) citizenship, many point out at (national) political membership. Rights, identities and practices once associated with national citizenship have spilled over or have drained underneath. But not political membership in the national community, read voting rights at national level. The equivalence between citizenship and voting rights is, however, not perfect. While there are rare cases of holding national voting rights without citizenship status, one can easily think of cases where actual citizens do not enjoy national voting rights (e.g. children, mentally-Ill, convicts, non-residents). In the normative literature citizenship is most often used as a shortcut for "democratic citizenship". The powerful fiction of democratic self-rule is called to justify authority, duties and allegiance. Citizenship then demarcates the boundaries of a democratic process. In this perspective, access to citizenship in congruous to access to democratic membership. But should we use the same criteria for political membership and citizenship status? In other words, is the question of access to status normatively distinct from the question of access to political membership? I would argue that the two questions are different. For example, criteria for democratic inclusion such as all-subjected or all-affected interests give us some hints as to how to demarcate political membership but can only partially inform a discussion about criteria for access to status. This is not to say (yet?) that status should be separated from political membership (e.g. recommending granting citizenship without voting rights) but that at the level of access to status: 1) not all aspects of political membership are relevant ( e.g. subjection, civic solidarity); and 2) some non- political membership issues arise (protection, social life). We cannot simply require from applicants to citizenship to be like citizens (or even a bit more) since they are not yet citizens.
Costica Dumbrava
Citizenship means many things. Trying to reveal the genuine characteristic of (national) citizenship, many point out at (national) political membership. Rights, identities and practices once associated with national citizenship have spilled over or have drained underneath. But not political membership in the national community, read voting rights at national level. The equivalence between citizenship and voting rights is, however, not perfect. While there are rare cases of holding national voting rights without citizenship status, one can easily think of cases where actual citizens do not enjoy national voting rights (e.g. children, mentally-Ill, convicts, non-residents). In the normative literature citizenship is most often used as a shortcut for "democratic citizenship". The powerful fiction of democratic self-rule is called to justify authority, duties and allegiance. Citizenship then demarcates the boundaries of a democratic process. In this perspective, access to citizenship in congruous to access to democratic membership. But should we use the same criteria for political membership and citizenship status? In other words, is the question of access to status normatively distinct from the question of access to political membership? I would argue that the two questions are different. For example, criteria for democratic inclusion such as all-subjected or all-affected interests give us some hints as to how to demarcate political membership but can only partially inform a discussion about criteria for access to status. This is not to say (yet?) that status should be separated from political membership (e.g. recommending granting citizenship without voting rights) but that at the level of access to status: 1) not all aspects of political membership are relevant ( e.g. subjection, civic solidarity); and 2) some non- political membership issues arise (protection, social life). We cannot simply require from applicants to citizenship to be like citizens (or even a bit more) since they are not yet citizens.
Costica Dumbrava
14 November 2010
Sunday thought, 14.11.2010
[following the great example of Andrei's Sunday links]
On the demos problem
The problem of the indeterminacy of the demos has often been ditched by political theorists. Let the people define itself, says Schumpeter! The few attempts to really tackle the issue were driven by the idea of a duty to include (those subjected to law, those affected by law or- an interesting combination of the two- those who have a stake in the community). But this perspective accounts for only some claims of inclusion; it is rather negative and retrospective. For example, despite its forward-looking aspect, the stakeholdership principle (R. Baubock) bases the assesment of the "stake" in the community on past interactions or connections (residence, family ties, interests etc.). What a duty perspective cannot account for are the claims of inclusion based on individual will. Of course, one would argue, (democratic) membership is a serious matter and it cannot hang on simple individual wishes. But a will to become member may not only come as a personal whim. One may be ready to show commitment, take up duties and fulfill certain requirements. One way to go is to revisit consent and contractual theories. If subjection to law is a valid ground for inclusion, what about the will to become subjected in order to be included? Although this approach will probably not lead us to a strong "right" to inclusion, it gives us a theoretical opportunity to address some future-oriented claims of membership.
Costica Dumbrava
On the demos problem
The problem of the indeterminacy of the demos has often been ditched by political theorists. Let the people define itself, says Schumpeter! The few attempts to really tackle the issue were driven by the idea of a duty to include (those subjected to law, those affected by law or- an interesting combination of the two- those who have a stake in the community). But this perspective accounts for only some claims of inclusion; it is rather negative and retrospective. For example, despite its forward-looking aspect, the stakeholdership principle (R. Baubock) bases the assesment of the "stake" in the community on past interactions or connections (residence, family ties, interests etc.). What a duty perspective cannot account for are the claims of inclusion based on individual will. Of course, one would argue, (democratic) membership is a serious matter and it cannot hang on simple individual wishes. But a will to become member may not only come as a personal whim. One may be ready to show commitment, take up duties and fulfill certain requirements. One way to go is to revisit consent and contractual theories. If subjection to law is a valid ground for inclusion, what about the will to become subjected in order to be included? Although this approach will probably not lead us to a strong "right" to inclusion, it gives us a theoretical opportunity to address some future-oriented claims of membership.
Costica Dumbrava
1 October 2010
Liquid currency: beer
It seems that in ancient civilizations, beer was quite a respectable good.
"..the workers who built the pyramids were paid in beer, according to records found at a nearby town where the construction workers ate and slept. The records indicate that at the time of the pyramids' construction, around 2500 BCE, the standard ration for a laborer was three or four loaves of bread and two jugs containing four liters of beer.." (Standage, 2005: 37)
More fascinating things about the driving liquids of history in:
Tom Standage, "A history of the world in six glasses", London, 2005.
"..the workers who built the pyramids were paid in beer, according to records found at a nearby town where the construction workers ate and slept. The records indicate that at the time of the pyramids' construction, around 2500 BCE, the standard ration for a laborer was three or four loaves of bread and two jugs containing four liters of beer.." (Standage, 2005: 37)
More fascinating things about the driving liquids of history in:
Tom Standage, "A history of the world in six glasses", London, 2005.
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